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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely acknowledged in the literature on ‘illiberal’ democracies that there are 
inherent deficits in institutional guarantees of accountability in many new Latin American 
democracies.  Administrations, if they so chose, can effectively avoid the traditional 
legislative constraints and judicial oversights posed by mechanisms of control over 
government actions and decisions.  Therefore, attention must be given to political 
practices and institutional deficits that prevent the consolidation of strong and 
accountable democratic institutions (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz: 2000).  Guillermo 
O’Donnell (1995) defines two dimensions traditionally used to measure the quality of 
democracy: vertical electoral accountability and horizontal accountability.  Vertical 
accountability focuses on elections as a form of control that citizens have over their 
government.  Horizontal accountability concerns the effective operation of the system of 
checks and balances and due process in governmental decision making.  Catalina 
Smulovitz and Enrique Peruzzotti (2000) claim the concept of vertical accountability 
must not only be limited to elections.  They argue that “by focusing on traditional 
mechanisms of accountability- elections, the separation of powers, and the existence of 
a system of checks and balances among the various branches of government-  [one] 
ignores the growth of alternative forms of political control that rely on citizen action and 
civil-society organizations.”  There is a very important social dimension to accountability 
that can be especially valuable in Latin American democracies.    
In this thesis, I will begin by introducing current definitions of accountability and 
will expand them to include the important social dimension, often overlooked in the 
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literature.   In chapter two I detail the specifics on the global commercial exploitation of 
children and its social manifestation in the Mexican city of Cancún, where my case 
study on child abuse is set.   In my thesis, I will refine our understanding of the concept 
of accountability through an empirical case study of Lydia Cacho Ribeiro, a Mexican 
human rights/women’s rights defender who exposed a child prostitution ring in Cancún, 
Mexico.  Cacho’s case is important for the understanding of the obstacles and 
successes in Mexico’s current democracy as it transitions from an electoral democracy 
to one that incorporates political agency and human capability through the intimate 
connection of political democracy, human development and human rights (O’Donnell: 
2004).   In this research I explore the roles of international and domestic human rights 
organizations in exposing Cacho’s case, the resistance of some government officials to 
social accountability, and the impact this case had on initiating horizontal mechanisms 
of control.  From this case I draw conclusions on how social accountability can be used 
to strengthen Latin American democracies.   
I conclude that social accountability is important in Mexico because civil society 
has to play a strong role as a social watchdog and investigator because of 
accountability constraints within the Congress.   Authoritarian centers of power maintain 
a firm hold over state-level judiciaries and international and domestic human rights 
organizations must play a central role in setting and pushing agendas. Nevertheless, 
social accountability mechanisms in Mexico are becoming more focused and effective 
at producing a clearer response in terms of actual congressional legislation and 
Supreme Court action.  Mexico’s case exemplifies the much stronger role civil society 
must play in new democracies.  However, highlighting social accountability is not meant 
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to de-emphasize the importance of horizontal/vertical accountability but, rather to stress 
how social accountability can promote and strengthen horizontal accountability.   
 I answer my broader research question by studying the specifics of Lydia Cacho 
Ribeiro’s case and generalizing my findings to other social accountability movements in 
Latin America.  This study can be used as a tool to analyze similar challenges in 
accountability in electoral democracies throughout Latin America.      
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Accountability as a Developmental Concept of Democracy 
 
Scott Morgenstern and Luigi Manzetti (2003: 132) note that “the concept of oversight 
is based upon the notion that while government is necessary for democracy to prosper 
in an orderly fashion, its institutions and the people who staff them must be accountable 
for their actions.  Doing otherwise invites people in official positions to abuse their 
discretionary power in order to pursue particular interests rather than the public good.” 
They note that the system of effective oversight in the United States did not develop just 
because the Constitution laid out a system of checks and balances, but instead there 
has been a non-linear progression towards more effective oversight.  The authors 
observe the failure of many Latin American countries to mature oversight institutions 
despite the adoption of a United States-style presidential system.  Morgenstern and 
Manzetti compare the historical development of oversight institutions in the United 
States in the late 19th and early 20th century to those recently in Argentina.      
 Oversight is “the monitoring and control of one person or institution (generally 
termed the agent) by another (the principal), so that the agent acts in the principal’s 
interest” (Morgenstern and Manzetti: 2003).   They outline an inductive theory based on 
the United States’ relatively successful system of checks and balances and one 
particular typed of oversight-- legislative oversight of the executive.  This requires 
legislators who are motivated by: 1) A public outcry for reform (which generally implies 
the existence of a free and independent press) and 2) Political career interest in 
confronting, rather than supporting the executive.   
 
Corruption, Pedophilia and Corruption in Mexico                                            Pearsall  9 
Legislators advance oversight because they are to some degree independent 
from party leaders.  In pursuit of oversight legislators need means, which are functions 
of: 
a. A high level of professionalization of the legislature, 
b. A long-lived democracy to continue developing the institutions for vigilance 
among which an independent judiciary is paramount, and  
c. Sufficient constitutional authority to pursue their interest 
 
Despite the transition to democracy in many Latin American democracies 
experienced during the third wave of democratization (Huntington: 1992), struggles to 
uphold oversight institutions continue.  Guillermo O’Donnell classifies these newly 
formed democracies as ‘polyarchies:’ having flaws in the existing law concerning the 
administrative regulations that discriminate minorities and women as defendants in 
criminal cases and in prison conditions as well as discrimination in the application of 
law.  Within polyarchies, the law can be twisted and used in the favor of the powerful or 
for repression.  There is a distinction made in the relationship between bureaucracies 
and ‘ordinary citizens, meaning that if a person does not have the proper social status 
or connections, she is almost guaranteed to experience difficulties.  There also is 
irregularity between who has access to the judiciary and to fair process which is then 
further exacerbated by sheer lawlessness (O’Donnell, 1999).   
O’Donnell classifies Mexico as a “conditional political democracy.”  That is, one in 
which the pertinent characteristics of democracy are “satisfied at the national level, but 
there are significant discontinuities in terms of the reach of the legality of the state in 
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several regions, including the nondemocratic characteristics of subnational regimes.”  In 
addition, O’Donnell as of 2004, had reservations about saying that fair elections in 
Mexico had been truly institutionalized (2004).      
Liberal representative democracies can be distinguished from other types of 
regimes based on “their combination of an institutional framework of authorization of 
political power with a framework oriented to ensure the responsiveness and 
accountability of those authorized agents.”  The term ‘representative’ suggests the 
existence of a fundamental gap between political representatives and citizens.  This gap 
requires institutional mechanisms to guarantee that this separation does not result in 
illegal or unresponsive governments.  At the center of the concept of accountability lies 
the question: How precisely, does one regulate and reduce the gap between 
representatives and citizens? (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006)   
Accountability refers to the ability to ensure that public officials are answerable 
for their behavior, forced to justify and inform the citizenry about their decisions and 
possibly eventually be sanctioned for them.  Legal accountability is the concept that 
refers to a set of institutional mechanisms aimed at ensuring the actions of public 
officials are legally and constitutionally framed.  Constitutional norms, legal codes, 
administrative procedures and fundamental rights create a legal constitutional 
framework that constrains elected and nonelected political figures’ actions (Peruzzotti 
and Smulovitz, 2006).   Political accountability refers to the means to punish 
unresponsive or irresponsible administrations, usually through elections.   
However, some question the efficacy of both political and legal forms of 
accountability, claiming elections are ineffective because citizens only have one chance 
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to punish or reward behavior, voting is decentralized and that the average citizen 
experiences deficits of information that make him unable to adequately evaluate 
government performance and decisions.  Citizens also face difficulties with legal 
accountability when trying to subject public officials to the rule of law.  However, these 
deficits are not reserved only for Latin American democracies, but are found in 
problems of accountability in all democratic governments (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 
2006).  
Guillermo O’Donnell (2004) does, however, claim that Latin American 
polyarchies demonstrate “a notorious deficit of legal accountability” to the extent that 
they are not representative democracies but delegative.  In delegative democracies 
electoral mechanisms of vertical accountability are not complimented by effective 
instruments of horizontal accountability like intrastate agencies that are legally enabled 
and empowered to check and sanction unlawful action by state agencies or political 
actors.  Therefore the executive (in Mexico the president as head executive and party 
leader) is largely free of constitutional and legal restraints despite the fact that there is a 
‘formal’ system of checks and balances.  This traditionally has been true in Mexico, but 
the federal executive branch is becoming more responsible to checks and balances 
since the 1994 reforms and even more so with the election of Vicente Fox Quesada in 
2000.  
 
Social Accountability 
Peruzzotti and Smulovitz expand O’Donnell’s model of vertical accountability to 
include the social dimension that had been previously overlooked.  Though elections 
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are the sole mechanism for authorizing political representation, they are not the only 
vertical tool for holding representatives accountable.  The authors claim that elections 
need to be complemented by an active civil society and autonomous media institutions 
through the workings of civic associations, NGOs, social movements, and media 
organizations that can add new resources to traditional discussions of electoral and 
constitutional mechanisms of government control.  Furthermore, the actions of civil 
society and the media can, on occasion, compensate for some of the built-in deficits of 
accountability instruments.  The authors define social accountability as follows: 
 
Social accountability is a nonelectoral yet vertical mechanism of 
control of political authorities that rests on the actions of an array of 
citizens’ associations and movements and the media.  The actions of 
these groups monitor public officials, expose governmental 
wrongdoing, and can activate the operation of horizontal agencies.  
Social accountability employs both institutional and noninstitutional 
tools.  The activation of legal actions or claims before oversight 
agencies is an example of an institutionally channeled action, social 
mobilizations and media exposés are examples of noninstitutional 
ones.   
 
Social accountability is similar, yet distinctly different from vertical and horizontal 
accountability.  Unlike electoral vertical accountability, social accountability can be 
activated in between elections and ‘on demand.’  Similar to horizontal accountability, 
social accountability can oversee politicians and representative officials while politicians 
while they make policy decisions.  Social accountability also differs in the way that it 
imposes sanctions, even if these sanctions are most likely symbolic and not official.  In 
 
Corruption, Pedophilia and Corruption in Mexico                                            Pearsall  13 
contrast to the other forms of accountability, social accountability can perform watchdog 
functions without the need of majorities or constitutional entitlements.   
Figure 1.1 
 
Source: Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006. pg. 27 
 
Therefore, social accountability emphasizes the ‘intensity’ of their claims and the 
impact on social opinion while actors in the electoral environment have to maximize 
‘extension’ of their support through convincing members and agencies of representative 
bodies.  The three main ways social accountability is exercised is through judicialization, 
social mobilization and mediatization (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz: 2006).    
 
Corruption, Pedophilia and Corruption in Mexico                                            Pearsall  14 
Judicialization or legal strategy entails “submission by individuals or social actors 
of legal claims or legally framed petitions to the courts or other control agencies” 
(Perzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006: 20).  It is an instrument that civil society and individuals 
can use to force the state to intervene in political and social disputes in which public 
actors want to avoid.  Using legal claims as a way of framing social demands provides a 
‘seal’ of legitimacy to the claims and forces the state to take a stance on the advanced 
claims.  Judicialization is especially useful in Latin America because of the steps taken 
in recent years to increase the number of regular legal claims, the appearance of legal 
institutions which expand the ways in which citizens may petition their rights, and a 
greater number of actors authorized to make claims (Perzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006). 
A second way that social accountability is exercised is through social 
mobilization.  Control is achieved when organized social actors are able to call attention 
to a particular problem or public wrongdoing as a tool to demand legal accountability.  
For social mobilization to be successful, the claim and the problem must be visible, 
aggregate public opinion and threaten reputation or career costs to public agents. 
Lastly, mediatization can be used to exercise social accountability through 
exposing the wrongdoing, increasing visibility of the claims and imposing reputation 
costs on public agents who need reputation protection to hold public office.  Individual 
journalists, media associations, civil society or individual citizens can initiate this aspect 
of social control.   In Latin America in recent years there has been an increase in 
investigative journalism, civil society creating public agendas and autonomy of media 
organizations leading to the emergence of more aggressive watchdog journalism.   
Overall, social accountability has the greatest chance of being effective when 
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theses three strategies are used together because the task of control is distributed 
amongst different agencies and actors.  There is not sequential relationship between 
the different aspects; therefore any of the three could spark the other two.  Working 
together the three parts have the potential for controlling governmental actions in 
representative democracies and is one of the many roads that lead to more 
governmentally accountability.   Due to the unique characteristics present in Latin 
America, social accountability can be an effective tool for holding and reminding public 
officials that they are accountable.     
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
 
 
Cancún 
 
 Early in the 20th century, Cancún and the state of Quintana Roo was nicknamed 
“the Mexican Siberia.”  Porfirio Díaz established the region as a suitable place for 
undesirables and rebels.  Shortly after, the region was viewed as similar to the frontier 
of the West in the United States.  Towns were established by men seeking their fortune 
from the natural resources of the Yucatan Peninsula.       
Modern Cancún has its foundations in the early 1970s.  In 1969, the World Bank 
recommended that the Mexican government create tourist destinations along its 
coastline, capitalizing on the beautiful natural resources.  Cancún was chosen along 
with Loreto, Iztapa, Bahías de Huatulco, and Los Cabos (Cacho: 2005).  As the result of 
a poll carried out by the Bank of Mexico during the government of Luis Echeverría 
(1970-1976), Cancún, which up to that time consisting of coconut palms, was deemed 
“touristically exploitable.” The few inhabitants who lived in the place were to be found in 
Puerto Juárez, the port for crossing to Isla Mujeres.  In 1974 when the first hotels were 
built in the region, 90% of the inhabitants were male, with the few women that ventured 
to Cancún coming with their husbands, engineers and construction workers.  This sets 
the groundwork for the male dominated ‘machismo’ culture that is characteristic of 
modern Cancún (Cacho: 2005).   
According to data from the 1990 Census, only 21% of the inhabitants of the 
municipality were born in Quintana Roo, while 74% came from other states, particularly 
the neighboring State of Yucatan, 51%, and 12% from Mexico City.  With the influx of 
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workers and developers came rapid expansion without attention to community 
structures and institutions.  Elena Azaola wrote in a UNICEF-DIF report (Azaola: 2001): 
The inhabitants mention that hardly had an area been cleared when 
beer shops, that were often the first solid constructions in the 
region, sprang up. This has continued to happen since, to date, 
there are many more places that sell alcoholic drinks (perhaps 
some 2 thousand) than schools, health centers, or sports and 
recreational establishments for children and young people. In reality 
the town has only recently, for example, built two higher education 
schools and another two offering technical studies, there are also 
only two small libraries, that are badly conditioned and with few 
books, and that do not have the resources or modern technology 
necessary to make culture accessible to the young people. It goes 
without saying that there are no other alternatives for culture, art 
and recreation in the locality.  
 
 During the period 1990-1995 the annual average rate of growth in the 
municipality of Benito Juárez was 10.6%, the highest in the whole country where the 
average was 2.04%.  This is largely due to the surprising growth in the hotel industry 
and tourism in general.  Almost three-quarters of the population employed in the 
municipality, 74% work in the tertiary sector, while only 17% are employed in the 
secondary sector.  Most of this population works in building and in different posts in 
hotels.  Eight percent of the population in employment earns less than the minimum 
wage, while 45% earn between 1 and 3 times the minimum wages.  Quintana Roo is 
seventh in the country in terms of Gross Domestic Product per capita (Azaola: 2001).    
The districts are called super-blocks and take their names from numerical 
language with the one hundreds consisting of 101,102, 102, followed by two hundreds 
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and so on up to the present five hundreds.  Azaola suggests that the use of numerical 
names could possibly be “related to the difficulty of the inhabitants of Cancún to find an 
identity they can be recognized by, an identity that is different from the one of providing 
services and welcoming tourists, that is, the identity that is anchored in a purely 
economic profile” (2001, 35).  Regardless of the validity of that statement, one can 
easily observe that the town was not built around public spaces or land marks that 
usually signify to its inhabitants a since of identity: the parade ground, the main square, 
the cathedral or government offices, spaces that provide distinctive symbols for a 
community. 
The hotel zone in downtown Cancún offers a clear contrast to the worker 
neighborhoods that surround it, with its many grandiose buildings and urban 
infrastructure providing all kinds of services. This different world clearly exercises a 
strong power of attraction for the local youth who, in one way or another, long to form 
part of it.  Azaola writes, “the tourists, the type of life they lead in Cancún and their 
entertainment constitute the model to be followed by young local people who perhaps 
lack other points of reference” (2001, 26). Youth often resent the preferential treatment 
the local authorities give to tourists and feel discriminated against in their own country. 
Foreign tourists are given all kinds of concessions and exemptions from “the police 
rules prohibiting the consumption of drugs and alcohol in the streets, the presence of 
minors in night clubs and offences against morality, all of which happen frequently 
particularly among the more than 100,000 spring breakers who arrive each year and 
spend an enormous amount of money which is considered more important than 
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applying the rules” (Azaola, 36).  However, while the style of living of the young tourists 
generally lasts only as long as their vacations, for the youth of Cancún, it contrastingly 
“constitutes the obligatory point of reference that they have within their reach, as they 
live in a locality that has gone out of its way to satisfy tourism” (Azaola, 36).  
There is also a generation gap between the lifestyles of youth in Cancún aspire 
to have and the lifestyles of their parents.  Some of them are students who live with their 
families and go to these places in a covert way while their parents are out at work, 
either because they have problems with addiction or because it gives them access to a 
certain way of living and consumption that their parents cannot give them. 
 
Children in the Sex Industry 
 Bars and nightclubs of all types where people go to drink, dance, see a show or 
ask for girls are an intrinsic part of the way of life in Cancún.  Although the figures vary 
from one source to another, Azaola reports that “there are between 200 and 300 sex 
trade establishments in the locality, they also exist in all the tourist points of the region, 
especially in Playa del Carmen, Isla Mujeres and Cozumel, as well as in the tourist 
corridor that runs from Cancún to Playa del Carmen” (2001, 37).  Figures from those 
who are responsible for health control in Cancún indicate that for each one thousand 
prostitutes, 300 are under age. However, this might be a conservative estimate given 
that it is taken from those who have applied for a health card.  Protocol in health 
establishments in the past in Cancún was to ask for official documents certifying age 
from children working in the clubs or the sex industry, but they have stopped doing so 
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because this was proven to be no deterrent and was only depriving the children of 
needed medical attention.  Currently health cards are only denied to very young girls.   
In addition, there are adolescent boys who work in the milieu, either as 
transvestites in shows or as prostitutes for homosexuals. It is thought that for “every 10 
establishments where girls work, it is calculated that there is one for boys” (UNICEF-
DIF, 37).  Unlike their female counterparts, boys who work in the milieu usually are 
migrants from other states because they prefer to avoid reproaches from their families 
and their communities.  Young male waiters and entertainers offer sexual favors to older 
female tourists or students who come during the spring break season.   
UNICEF-DIF (2001:46) reports that at least 700 children are being exploited in 
the locality that is Cancún.   The categories are prostitution, sex tourism, trafficking and 
pornography.   Included in this calculation are boys and girls up to the age of 18 despite 
the fact that the Penal Code of Quintana Roo establishes 16 as the age of majority for 
criminal effects because Mexico became a signatory of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child in 1990.  Prostitution is not designated as a crime for those over 18 (16 in 
Quintana Roo), but the Federal Penal Code does prohibit exploitation with the objective 
of profiting from the sexual work of others, regardless of whether they are under or over 
18 years of age.  Under article 201 of the Federal Penal Code “the procurement, 
facilitation, and force of a child under 18 years of age to perform acts of pornography, 
prostitution, consumption of narcotics, an/or commit criminal deed is a criminal offense 
punishable by a prison term at least 5 years in length (Ives, 2001).  As for state laws, 
few states define child pornography as a crime but the ‘crime of corruption’ mentioned 
above can be employed to punish these actions.  Article 208 of the Federal Penal Code 
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states that a “person who promotes, conceals, or permits the carnal intercourse of a 
child under the age of 18 will be sentenced to 8 to 12 years in prison.  Recently 
incorporated into the Federal Penal Code is Article 201 bisection 3 which makes a 
criminal offense “any person who promotes, advertises, invites, facilitates, or negotiates, 
by any means, the movement of a person(s) inside or outside national territory with the 
purpose of having sexual relations with children under 18 years of age” (Ives, 2001).  
This addition to the code was integrated to combat sex tourism, like that which takes 
place in Cancún.   
 Sex tourism is defined as “the act of traveling to another country to engage in 
commercial sex, usually due to greater tolerance (or legality) in the destination country” 
(Shirk and Webber: 2004).  Recently there have been increasing crackdowns on sex 
tourism in Asia, therefore, “many North Americans are now turning to Mexico and 
Central America for the sexual abuse of children,” says the director of the Latin 
American Programs of Casa Alianza (Shirk and Webber: 2004).  The US State 
Department reports that “sex tourism, including child sex tourism, appears to be 
growing, especially in tourist areas such as Acapulco and Cancún, and border towns 
like Tijuana; foreign pedophiles arrive most often from Western Europe and the United 
States” (Trafficking in Persons Report: 2007).  In February 2003, multimillionaire 
Thomas Frank White, age 67, was arrested in Thailand for the sexual exploitation of 
minors, including child prostitution and child sexual abuse in an orphanage he co-
founded in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico.   
  
        
 
Corruption, Pedophilia and Corruption in Mexico                                            Pearsall  22 
Figure 2.1 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Factors Contributing To the Sexual Exploitation of Children and Youth 
 
Domain   Contributing Factors 
Macro/Contextual  - socio-economic 
(External)   - societal attitudes toward children and youth 
- social anomie among children and you, i.e., a lack of connectedness on the part 
of youth with the larger society and their place within it 
- poverty 
- child victims of crime and violence 
- societal responses to crimes committed against children, including sexual 
crimes 
- The presence of pre-existing adult prostitution “markets’ 
- the presence of groups advocating child-adult sexual relationships 
- sexual behavior of unattached and transient males including the military, 
seasonal workers, truckers, motor cycle gangs, conventioneers 
- community knowledge and attitudes concerning HIV/AIDS and other sexually 
transmitted diseases 
Micro/Situational - Socio-Behavioral 
(external)   - Family dysfunction 
- Parental drug dependency 
- History of physical and/or sexual assault  
- Personal drug dependency 
- School other social performance failures 
- Gang Membership 
- Active recruitment into prostitution by others  
- Peers 
- Parents or other family members (including siblings) 
- Local pimps 
- National and or international crime organizations 
Individual/  - Psychogenic 
(internal)  - Poor self esteem 
- Chronic depression 
- External locus of control 
- Seriously restricted future orientation 
 
Estes, Richard J and Neil Alan Weiner. The Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children In the U.S., Canada and 
Mexico. Executive Summary. University of Pennsylvania: Center for the Study of Youth Policy. September 19, 2001 
(Revised 2/20/02). (pg 6) 
 
Corruption, Pedophilia and Corruption in Mexico                                            Pearsall  23 
 
Elena Azaola, published in 2004 that some 17,000 minors in Mexico are victims of 
the sex trade.  Azaola's research included visits to the establishments where these 
children and teenagers are forced to engage in prostitution and interviews with some of 
those who have managed to escape (Shirk and Webber: 2004).   Figure 2.2 lists the 
leading factors contributing to commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC).  
In 1995, the Mexican Attorney General's Office broke up a crime ring devoted to 
publishing and selling child pornography. A year later, a special investigative force was 
created, which has since uncovered at least one child pornography or prostitution 
network every year (Shirk and Webber: 2004).  Of the cases of child pornography in 
Cancún, most have been brought against foreigners who abused children from the 
locality. Azaola notes “one of these cases was of an Italian who met up with several 
children in a petrol station and took them to a place in Puerto Juárez where he abused 
them and took photographs of them.” (Azaola: 2000).  Until recently, law enforcement 
viewed child pornography as non-commercial; filmed, photographed or audio-taped 
produced by individuals for personal use or swapped amongst a group of pedophiles 
(Hartman et al., 1984).  However, due to globalization and innovations in 
communication technologies like webcams, child pornography can be recorded and 
stored and distributed more easily.   
In reality there is no real measurement of size of the child pornography industry.  
O’Connell Davidson (2005)  writes that it is sometimes parasitic of the adult sex 
industry, but often times independent due to its illegality and cultural/moral disapproval.  
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Working independently, networks of pedophiles ‘share’ victims and the pornography 
they produce amongst themselves.   
In addition, research has uncovered the recruitment of children as sex workers by 
organized crime networks.  According to the US State Department’s 2007 Trafficking in 
Persons Report, Mexico is a source, transit, and destination country for persons 
trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. The 
majority of victims trafficked into the country come from Central America, destined for 
Mexico or the United States. The sale of children for sexual purposes can include girls 
who are given in marriage to older adults who give benefits to the family in exchange or 
children sold by their parents through a middleman who then sells them to an American 
family.  Nicole Ives (2001) reports that young girls are trafficked across the northern 
border and forced to have sex with migrant workers.  Figure 2.1 shows the different 
factors that lead to the demand, supply and impunity of human trafficking.   Factors on 
the supply side of human trafficking are poverty, discrimination against women and 
gender based violence.  On the border with Guatemala, “children, mostly girls, are 
‘bought’ by club owners from procurers who find them in their villages within the state or 
across the border and bring them along under duress or under false pretenses with 
phony promises of work.”   Once trafficked, the girls must work to pay off what the club 
owner paid for them, plus food and lodging; the system of perpetual debt forces them to 
stay in servitude.   
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Figure 2.2: Human Trafficking Demand, Supply and Impunity Triangle 
 
Source: http://www.oas.org/cim/English/Proj.Traf.AlisonPaper.htm
 
 In 2002, the Fox administration carried out a major publicity campaign against 
the sexual abuse of minors, with support from the United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF).  The campaign briefly moved the issue to the top of the national agenda, but 
with the passage of time, it has gradually slipped out of the spotlight once again.  Cacho 
insists that the trial she is facing represents "a clear message to those of us who dare to 
speak out and expose the organized crime that is behind child pornography" (2005:13).  
Her arrest further verifies the danger experienced by journalists and child advocates in 
Mexico.   
 
 
 
 
Corruption, Pedophilia and Corruption in Mexico                                            Pearsall  26 
CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY- LYDIA CACHO RIBEIRO 
 
The Arrest 
On the night of December 16, 2005, Lydia Cacho Ribeiro was arrested outside 
the Centro Integral de Atencion a las Mujeres (CIAM), the women’s shelter she directs 
in Cancún, Mexico.  Several Puebla state judicial officers approached in an unmarked 
car and heavy-handedly detained her.  “They came towards me and they said ‘Lydia 
Cacho, you’re arrested,’” Cacho told ABC new reporters. “One of them just took a gun 
and put it to my head and said ‘Shut up.” (ABC News, 6/21/06: 1).  Cacho claimed that 
she never received any subpoenas (Reporters Sans Frontieres, Dec. 22, 2005: 1).  The 
federal agents assigned to protect Cacho allowed Puebla police to arrest her, despite 
Cacho begging them to follow her.  She was then transported 20 hours by car from the 
state of Quintana Roo to Puebla,  during which time she was not allowed to contact her 
lawyer or take medication she needed to control her bronchitis (International PEN, 
March 8, 2006: 2).  She told Heather Gehlert of AlterNet via telephone the following 
(2007): 
 I thought they were going to kill me.  I was sure they were 
abducting me illegally even though they are policemen. I’ve been a 
journalist for 20 years and I was born in Mexico 44 years ago, so 
we tend to not trust police just because we have enough evidence 
of a lot of police selling their services to private persons to just kill 
people or abduct people or things like that.  So I thought they were 
doing that.  They did not give me enough information- everything 
was very irregular.  The way they arrested me was a big group of 
policemen with guns- I mean, they really arrested me like I was a 
drug dealer.  So, I thought they were going to kill me- they kept 
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telling me so.  They told me they were going to drop me in the 
middle of the ocean, and they kept asking me if I knew how to 
swim.  They said they were going to rape me and all sorts of things 
during 20 hours.  Every minute was like the hardest minute.   
 
 Once at San Miguel state prison, she was detained for 30 hours (Frontline, 
01/2006/24: 2).  Because of the protection of a female jail guard, Cacho was taken to 
the jail infirmary and escaped plans to rape her.  There she waited until the judge called 
on her and posted the $10,000 bail (Gerhlet, 2007: 1).  Judge Rosa Celia Pérez 
González of Puebla’s Fifth Penal Court released Cacho from San Miguel State Prison 
the following day on bail of 108,000 pesos pending a further ruling on 23 December. On 
that date, Judge Pérez ordered that Cacho be detained awaiting trial. However, she 
remained free since she had already posted bail and lodged an appeal against the 
decision (International PEN, March 8, 2006: 1). 
The arrest was in response to a libel suit and preliminary investigation filed with 
the Procuraduría General de Justicia del Estado (Puebla Public Prosecutor's Office), 
against Cacho by Jose Kamel Nacif Borge, nicknamed the “Kind of Denim’, a Mexican 
businessman (Amnesty International, 19 December, 2005: 1).  Nacif accused Cacho of 
libeling him in her book, Los Demonios del Eden, by linking him to Jean Succar Kuri, a 
Cancún businessman who had been accused of pedophilia and running a prostitution 
ring (Walker, San Diego Union-Tribune, 2006: 2).  Los Demonios del Edén contains the 
personal accounts of minors who talk about the sexual abuse they suffered at the hands 
of the Cancún ring in which prominent figures were allegedly involved.  In Cacho’s book, 
Succar’s victims describe how he sexually abused them himself, set up a prostitution 
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ring to allow others to abuse them, and photographed them for his own pornographic 
uses and for the Internet.  
Figure 3.1: Chart of Succar’s Alleged Associates 
 
 
Los Demonios del Eden 
 In her book Los Demonios del Eden, Lydia Cacho Ribeiro features the 
testimonies of the child victims of Jean Succar Kuri and his pedophilia ring.  Here are 
summaries of the main testimonies in the book.  It opens with the story of “Cintia” (the 
names have been changed to protect the victim’s identities): 
 
‘Cintia’  
Cintia met Succar when she was nine years old.  She testified “I went to 
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his house and swam in his pool, I and other children.  He was there with his 
wife.  We came to play and afterwards we were driven home by his driver.  I 
was always given a little money for me to buy candies, or whatever I wanted” 
(Cacho, 2005:19).  The day that Emma brought Cintia to Succar’s hotel, 
Solymar, Succar brought her to his room in the hotel, unhooked her pants and 
touched her.  Succar told Cintia that this is what all fathers do with their 
children and that she just did not know about it because she did not have a 
father.  He told her that if she told her mother, he would kill her mother.  She 
testified that Succar photographed her performing sexual acts.  She continued 
to be abused by Succar until she was thirteen years old.  During the interview 
Cacho notes that Cintia is nervous and very serious; signs of psychological 
distress (2005).   
  
‘Emma’ 
Emma was the first victim to speak out against Succar.   She revealed his abuse 
to her Morals teacher at school.  Emma had been a victim of Succar’s since she was 
twelve years old.  She was brought to Solymar by a friend, Samaria who was older than 
her.  Samaria told her that ‘Tio Johnny’ would give her money to buy school clothes.  
There were many other children from Emma’s school at Solymar, most of them older 
that she.  She testified that at first Succar bought her beautiful things and she liked that 
especially because she did not have a father and her mother was an alcoholic.   
 The first time Succar abused her, he said “Close your eyes, we are going to play” 
(Cacho, 2005: 39).  After the abuse, she cried and bled a lot.  After that, when Succar 
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would touch her, she said her body was paralyzed.  After oral sex with Succar, Emma 
testified that she ran into the bathroom where she vomited and cried.   Succar filmed 
Emma naked and performing sexual acts with others.  All of the photographs were 
stored on a black computer that Emma reported seeing often in Succar’s bedroom.   
 Emma recalled a trip with Succar to Mexico City.  There she ate at an elegant 
restaurant with Emilio Gamboa Patron, the current PRI Parliamentary Coordinator in the 
Chamber of Deputies and Miguel Angel Yunes, the Director General of the Institute of 
Security and Social Services for State Workers.  At this time Yunes gave her one 
hundred dollars to buy a new dress.  She said that Yunes’ yacht, Fedayin was often in 
Cancún outside of Solymar.  Once, Yunes brought to Solymar his lover and her eight 
year old daughter.   After Succar tried to touch Sofia, the daughter, the girlfriend got 
angry at Succar.  Yunes then kicked his girlfriend and her daughter out of the house.  
Emma said she believed that Yunes thought what Succar was doing was normal.  He 
never asked her if she was a minor.  Emma said she did not come forward until 2003 
because Succar was such a rich and powerful man (Cacho, 2005: 40).   
One of Succar protectors named in the book was Kamel Nacif Borge, one of 
Mexico’s most successful businessmen and richest citizens and the owner of the 
Tarrant Apparel Group (TAG), headquartered in Los Angeles.  TAG customers have 
included the Gap, Wal-Mart, Levi’s, the Limited, Charming Shoppes, Tommy Hilfiger, 
Abercrombie & Fitch, The Wet Seal, and Federated Department Stores. Cacho writes 
that Succar and Nacif were good friends, going as far back as 1975 when they met in 
the airport in Mexico City.  Succar was in the migration office, about to be deported 
because he lacked proper permission to work in Mexico, when coincidentally another 
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Lebanese- Mexican, Nacif, entered the office.  Nacif then used his influence as an 
international businessman with many interactions with the Customs and Migration 
offices, to guarantee Succar citizenship (Cacho 2005: 30).   
As a businessman Nacif had been very successful, though not without being 
criticized.  It is alleged that he received “huge financial incentives from the Mexican 
government” and is known to have defaulted on his suppliers.  Furthermore, he owes 
millions of dollars in taxes and has been accused of abusive labor practices and union-
busting” (Tax, 2007: 1).   After an international coalition of anti-sweatshop groups 
organized a campaign against TAG in October 2003, a number of these retailers 
withdrew their business.  In response, Nacif closed down his Mexican factories in 
February, 2004, putting five thousand people out of work instead of making 
improvements.  Kamel Nacif is also known as a Las Vegas high roller linked with mob 
figures, the illegal sale of narcotics and firearms as well as with money laundering (Tax, 
2007: 1).  Furthermore, Nacif was a large contributor to the Governor of Puebla, Mario 
Plutarco Marín Torres’ gubernatorial campaign (La Jornada interview with Cacho, 
December 29, 2005: 2).   
Cacho documented instances in which Nacif witnessed illegal actions by Succar.  
He is also mentioned five times in Cacho’s book in testimonies of the victims, whom 
they indicate him as one of Succar’s friends, and as one of his powerful protectors.  The 
book also mentions events in Nacif’s past, all of which are backed up by other 
journalistic sources, such as the involvement of Nacif in a money laundering scandal in 
Las Vegas, reports of sexual harassment in his assembly plants, labor accusations 
launched against his factory operations and benefits received from the Fobaproa 
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(Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorro or "Banking Fund for the Protection of 
Savings") (La Jornada, Dec. 29, 2005). 
The book documents the involvement of other important PRI politicians such as 
Emilio Gamboa Patrón, a high ranking party member who has held eight prominent 
positions since 1972- currently serving as a Deputy from the state of Yucatán, and 
Executive Secretary for National Security, Miguel Ángel Yunes, in protecting Succar 
Kuri.  “Emma” testified in front of the Attorney General of the State of Quintana Roo 
(PGR) that Alejandro Gongora Vera, Nacif and Yunes were involved in Succar’s ring.   
 
Succar Exposed 
 Emma made her statement to the Attorney General’s Office of Quintana Roo 
(PGJE) on October 23, 2003.  She told them that she had had sexual relations with 
Succar and that in his house in Los Angles he had pornographic material of sex 
between children and with children and himself.  She said his wife was an expert with 
technology and had all of it on the computer.  She also said that other members of the 
pedophile ring included Alejandro Gongora Vera, Kamel Nacif and Miguel Angel Yunes.  
At that time, she did not imagine that the ring was as large as it was.  Four other victims 
denounced Succar on October, 24 (Cacho, 2005, 47).  
Shortly after, Emma’s teacher brought her to a lawyer named Acacio.  Acacio 
then introduced Emma to her friend Leidy Campos Vera, the subdirector of preliminary 
investigation at the state prosecutor’s office.  Emma confided everything to Campos 
Vera, including giving her a video of a secretly taped conversation between Emma and 
Succar in which he admitted that sex with young girls was his weakness.  Miguel Angel 
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Pech Cen, the sub-prosecutor for the northern zone, was appointed to the case along 
with Campos. 
 At this point the Federal Investigations Agencies (AFI) opened an investigation 
into the possibility that the case was linked to organized crime.  Therefore, the case was 
expedited.  Interestingly, Jean Succar Kuri, his wife and his son Jerry, fled to his house 
in Los Angeles, USA that same day.  It was curious that even though Campos, Pech 
Cen and the state prosecutor’s office had in their hands for fifteen days a taped 
confession from Succar during his conversation with Emma, they failed to issue a 
warrant for his arrest.  Succar later testified that Pech Cen called Succar and told him 
what the plans were the day before Emma officially denounced Succar to the AFI.  This 
is similar to the impunity that exists for actors involved in organized crime because of 
their connections and protectors in prosecutorial roles.   
On October 31, 2003 Leidy Campos Vera and Miguel Angle Pech Cen conducted 
a large press conference in which they released the names of all the victims involved.  
Subsequently, the press and locals began to harass the children and mothers.  Some 
victims even received threatening calls from Succar and his wife in Los Angles.  CIAM, 
Lydia Cacho Ribeiro’s organization for battered women took them in.  Women and child 
activists were outraged.  They claimed that anyone working with domestic or sexual 
abuse cases know that it is of the utmost importance to protect the identities of the 
victims.   
The case against Succar has not gone forward due to delays in the extradition 
process.  The U.S. is very protective of its citizens and is distrustful of Mexico’s 
investigative capabilities.  However, it did not take long for Succar’s powerful friends to 
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denounce him.  All of his old friends claimed they were just mere acquaintances and did 
not know Succar well.   
 
After the Arrest 
After the incident of her arrest, Cacho responded to the defamation and libel suit 
filed by Nacif and brought a complaint suit against Puebla governor Mario Plutarco 
Marín Torres and the state prosecutor's office that same week.  She claimed her human 
rights had been violated (Reporters Sans Frontieres, Dec. 26, 2005: 2).  On January 1, 
2006, the State of Puebla dropped one count of criminal defamation against Cacho, but 
maintained the other.   However, as of January 17, 2006, Cacho still faced a 4-year 
prison sentence for linking Nacif to child pornography ring under Mexico’s then libel 
laws.  Despite the dropping of one of the defamation suits, Cacho maintained that she 
would not get a fair trial in Puebla because of Nacif's close links with local authorities.  
She requested the trial be moved to Quintana Roo, her home state, or to be tried by a 
federal court.  On January 20, 2006, the court granted Cacho's request and the trial was 
moved to Quintana Roo (Reporters Sanz Frontieres, Dec 26, 2005: 2). 
On February 14, 2006 a telephone conversation between the governor of Puebla, 
Mario Plutarco Marín Torres, and businessman Kamel Nacif Borge, revealing a plot to 
arrests and scare Lydia Cacho, appeared in La Jornada (Petrich, February 14, 2006: 1).  
It was then reproduced on radio stations across Mexico.  The tapes are thought to have 
been leaked by Nacif's now ex-wife (Cevallos, 9/5/2006: 2).  In the first conversation, 
Marín refers to Cacho as a 'bitch' and says he had had her arrested and taught a 
lesson.  Nacif asks Marín to pay a woman in jail to rape her.  Marín says he gave the 
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order to have the activist thrown in a cell with "nutcases and dykes" so that she would 
be raped (Cevallos, 9/5/2006: 1).  Nacif also thanks Marín by calling him “my precious 
governor” and says that he will send him “a beautiful bottle of cognac” (Roig-Franzia, 
April 1, 2007: 1).  In the second conversation between Nacif and Succar, they discuss 
two underage girls with whom they plan to have sex (Cevallos, 9/5/2006).  There are 
tapes of 12 conversations in all. 
In another of the anonymously recorded conservations leaked to the press, Nacif 
can be heard talking with Succar. The two exchange information on "the girl from 
Miami," who they refer to as "putita" (little whore), and whom they claimed to have paid 
2,000 dollars.  Succar asks Nacif when it would be best to bring the girl to Cancún, and 
the latter responds that "next week, you son of a bitch, but you bring her to fornicate" 
(Cevallos, 9/13/2006: 2). 
 
Media and International Organizations 
 When Cacho’s book, Los Demonios del Eden, was published in 2005, it was just 
a middling seller and received little press.  Media attention came when law enforcement 
leaked a covertly filmed conversation in which Succar Kuri acknowledges to Emma, one 
of the girls who testified in Cacho’s book, that fondling little girls is his ‘vice’ (Walker, 
April 4, 2006: 1).  In the video Succar Kuri says, “It fascinates me to do this to her: to 
touch her, to caress her… That is all I do.  It is my vice,” he said. “Yes, it is a crime and 
yes, it is prohibited and yes, it is bad.  I am not saying that I am decent and perfect.  The 
thing is that I do not commit what we call abuse” (Walker, April 4, 2006: 2).  Days after 
the video was release, a Cancún judge issued a warrant for Succar Kuri’s arrest.  
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However, Succar had already left the country on a nonstop first-class flight to Los 
Angeles.  Cacho told the Washington Post that the local authorities did nothing to 
ensure Succar was taken into custody and in fact tipped him off about the allegations 
(Roig-Franzia April 3, 2007: 2).  Cacho also questioned whether journalists following the 
case took it seriously.  She wrote that she overheard male journalists discussing 
whether or not a 12-year-old could enjoy sex. 
  The case gained national and international media attention in December of 
2005, when Cacho was arrested.  The Washington Post reported that as Cacho was 
being taken into custody she triggered her car alarm, a predetermined signal to alert 
trouble to her staff, who were watching her arrest on security camera from inside her 
shelter, CIAM (Roig-Franzia, April 1, 2007).  From there emails and phone calls were 
sent to Cacho’s sympathizers both nationally and internationally.  Human rights groups 
including Amnesty International, the Committee to Protect Journalists of New York, the 
Commission of Human Rights, the World Organization Against Torture, and the Pan-
American Company of Press were notified.  Amnesty International had been following 
Cacho’s case since 2004 when she reported receiving death threats from a former 
police officer of the Policía Judicial del Estado, State Judicial Police Force, in the state 
of Coahuila.  He was under investigation by the federal authorities (Agentes Federales 
de Investigación) due to his alleged links with organized crime and at the time his wife 
and children were being sheltered by CIAM.  Amnesty International released two 
separate Urgent Actions appeals to be sent in concern of Cacho’s safety. 
 The impact of the national and international networks of human rights groups that 
Cacho’s team contacted was felt the day of her arrest.  In an interview with Mother 
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Jones, Cacho said (Scott, May 1, 2007: 1): 
“The network worked really fast. I was arrested on the 16th at 12 
o'clock. Probably two o'clock in the morning, the police stopped by a 
beach and told me I was going to jump in the ocean and die there, that 
they were going to rape me—and all these things, all these 
psychological forms of torture. But then they received a phone call. The 
caller told them to stop it and take me to Puebla. I didn't know [what 
had happened]; I'm telling you now, but I didn't know then, I just knew 
that the officer received a phone call in front of me and said, "Change of 
plans" and took me back to the car. It was months after that that we 
learned what happened. But [at the time] the governor of Puebla and 
others got calls from everyone you can imagine. An urgent action from 
Amnesty International arrived at the governor's office by fax and to the 
press and to the whole country”. 
 
 Cacho also claimed the support of almost all the news agencies within the 
country, hundreds of fellow journalists and friends, including a dozen national 
columnists.  Two countries offered her political asylum and several PRI affiliated 
politicians renounced the actions of Governor Marín (Scott, May 1, 2007: 1).  National 
support for Cacho was reaffirmed when prominent news dailies like EL Universal and La 
Jornada ran interviews with and articles written by Cacho, expressing her version of the 
events.   
 Internationally, Cacho’s case was reported on by the Washington Post, the San 
Diego Union-Tribune, The New York Times and ABC News. Reporters Sans Fronteras 
chronicled online each new development in the section, “Press Freedom Day by Day.”   
The case is still under investigation by the newly established Special Prosecutor’s Office 
for the Attention of Crimes against Journalists (FEADP). The new office is attached to 
the General Prosecutor’s Office (PGR) and was established by President Felipe 
Calderon in response to country-wide violence against journalists.  It is headed by 
lawyer and human rights advocate David Vega Vera, who, between February and 
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October, received 72 cases of harassment, intimidation and assault against journalists 
(International Press Institute, 2006: 1) 
 
Political Response 
  After the recorded tapes were released, politicians from the PAN and PRD took 
the opportunity to renounce Gov. Marín and priista politics.  Though there has been 
increasingly more opposition party participation in government, the PRI still maintains a 
stronghold majority in Congress.  This leads to a very divisive and partisan environment.  
Opposition party leaders took the opportunity afforded by Cacho’s case to denounce 
practiced of the PRI.   La Jornada reported that Caesar Raúl Ojeda, of the PRD, said 
"sadly the recordings [of the conversations between Nacif and Marín] are not legal 
testimony in this country, by shame and by the deal that he permitted to be given to the 
journalist Lydia Cacho, the governor should renounce."  Representative Jesus González 
Schmal, of Convergencia, accused Marín of ordering prosecutor Blanca Laura Villeda, 
the agent of the Public Department assigned to the case, Rose Breeze Espejel, and the 
judge Rose Cecilia Pérez González ''of colluding to allow the revenge of this Mr. Kamel 
Nacif; this included the consent, the complicity and the direct responsibility of the 
governor" (translated from Becerril, Garduño and Mendez, Feb. 15, 2006: 2).    
On Feb. 21, 2006, the Chamber of Deputies asked the Supreme Court to 
investigate Marín’s role and determine whether Lydia Cacho’s constitutional rights had 
been violated.  In April, 2006, the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) 
introduced a bill in the Chamber of Deputies Justice and Human Rights Commission 
that called for the decriminalization of libel, slander and defamation to a civil offense 
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without jail time.  Additionally, it upheld the concept of professional secrecy for reporters 
by enabling them to keep the identity of their new sources confidential and not have to 
reveal them in court. The bill amended articles 350-363 of the Federal Penal Code. 
Once the bill was sent to the Senate, it stalled for over a year and was finally passed on 
March 6, 2007 in a 100-0 vote with one abstention (IFEX, March 7, 2007).  Felipe 
Calderon signed the legislation into law on April 12, 2007 (IFEX).   
Though the amendment in the federal penal code was a positive step forward, it was 
more symbolic than concrete, given that most defamation and libel cases are tried at the 
state and district level.  While waiting for Senate affirmation, the Mexico City Legislative 
Assembly adopted unanimously the “Law of Civil Responsibility for the Defense of 
Honor, Private Life, and Self-Image” (IFEX, May 1, 2006).   This law has become 
effective in Mexico City, where defamation is now a civil offense rather than a crime. 
Mexico City took a progressive first step, however the new law still has to be approved 
by local congresses in the other 32 states (Tax, January 2, 2007: 2).  Mexico’s legal 
system operates on separate state and federal levels, and federal laws do not 
supersede state laws, therefore, the fact that these restrictive laws still remain on the 
books in most Mexican states continue to prohibit journalists from working without fear 
of legal prosecution. 
After the SCJN ruled that no serious violations of human rights were committed 
against Cacho by Marín or any of his accomplices, Louise Arbour of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights suggested that Cacho leave the country.  Arbour also 
offered all the support of the UN to gain political asylum, legal advising and to respond 
to international courts (El Universal, February 16, 2008).     
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Discussion 
Issues of Accountability 
 What does this case say about accountability in Mexico?  Lydia Cacho’s case 
brings to light elements of authoritarian legacies, corruption/collusion of high ranking 
officials, police lawlessness, and the dangers of being a human rights activist in Mexico. 
This case suggests Governor Mario Marín Torres of Puebla did not hesitate to 
exercise his authoritarian powers.  Wayne Cornelius (1999: 4) writes that subnational 
political regimes, like that in the state of Puebla lead by Governor Marín, were controlled 
by hard-line anti-democratic elements linked to the PRI remain important in the 
twentieth century but still retain power after 2000.  After opposition parties have won 
seats in the federal, state and local legislators, as well as two presidencies, 
authoritarian enclaves still exist.   Historically under the PRI apparatus, political actors at 
every level were intimately connected through clientelistism, family ties, economic 
incentives, partisan loyalties and coercion (Cornelius, 1999: 10).  Under the PRI 
apparatus, if an actor was found to be involved in corruption or excess use of 
authoritarian power, he would be controlled out of the fear of embarrassing PRI higher-
ups and stifling his prospects of upward mobility in the party.  Direct intervention by the 
president was real possibility which served to discipline potential ‘troublemakers”.  
There was an ever-present credible threat that any breach of discipline would be 
severely and summarily punished (Cornelius, 1999: 11).   Though there is some debate 
over whether or not top-down control mechanisms within the PRI were as strong and 
effective as scholars once thought, one cannot deny that this system, however strong, is 
currently breaking down.  
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 This breakdown of presidential power accelerated during the Zedillo presidency 
(1994-2000), when he refused to get involved in low level political scandals.  When then 
governor of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva, was deeply implicated in drug-smuggling 
operations, Zedillo refused to lend his support to an impeachment move in Congress.  
This was related as a de facto approval of Villanueva’s highly authoritarian ways of 
controlling the legislature, the law enforcement and the media and granted impunity for 
Villanueva’s drug offenses, at least until he was out of office in 1999 (Cornelius,1999) .    
 Cornelius (1999: 13) argues that in the 1990s, the “subnational political arena will 
be the principle source of inertia and resistance to democratization, rather than the 
prime breeding ground for democratic advances (1999).”  While popular movements 
and both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ forms of democratization (O’Donnell, 1992) can be 
expected to continue to work in Mexico, it is important to note that a countervailing 
influence will be operating at the subnational level so long as anti-democratic and 
authoritarian forces at the state and local levels can act with relative impunity.  “In those 
subnational spaces where entrenched, hard-line PRIista leaders continue to hold sway, 
we can anticipate even greater impunity and more rigid authoritarian control, including 
freer recourse to official violence” (Cornelius, 1999: 7). 
 Governor Marín exemplifies a hard line PRIista whose authoritarian tendencies 
lead him to understand that he operates with impunity.  In the taped interviews with 
Nacif, Marín did not appear hesitant to wield his political powers go come to the rescue 
of a friend, campaign financier and denim tycoon.  
The close relationship between Marín and Nacif reveals collusion between state 
actors and business elites.  The weakening of political control, like in Mexico, opens up 
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room for corruption and collusion between organized crime and state actors.  
Considering this historical context, Stanley Pimentel (2000) examines how organized 
political and criminal elements come together in contemporary Mexico to allow 
collaboration with and control by, political authorities.  Pimentel argues that three 
centuries of occupation, exploitation and civic neglect by Spain, followed by a century of 
dictatorships by revolutionary leaders, barred democratic civic society in Mexico from 
evolving overnight.   
 Pimentel (2000) expands Lupsha’s two models of organized crime; the ‘elite-
exploitative’ and the ‘stage-evolutionary’ models.   The elite-exploitative model most 
accurately describes what has gone on in Mexico “where organized crime is a source of 
funding and illicit enrichment for the political elite and their social control agents” 
(Pimentel: 2000).  Corruption is initiated by organized crime in pursuit of insurance and 
protection from prosecution by the state, which accept payoffs, but are rarely the 
initiators of connections.  Social control agents, like the state, constantly threaten and 
tax traffickers and organized crime and in return these ‘cash cows’ are protected.  
Occasionally, state actors expose traffickers as ‘sacrificial lambs,’ in order to give the 
appearance of fighting crime.  However, over time traffickers became more powerful 
and the incorporation of other political parties allows for organized crime to gain greater 
autonomy.   What then takes place is organized crime that is autonomous from the state 
enough to challenge it both in military force and influence. 
   In the Cacho case, the relationship between the organized pedophilia ring and 
state does not fit nicely into one of these models.  Instead, the collusion and reciprocal 
relationship between the business elite (Nacif) and political actors (Marín), allow for 
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organized crime to be protected and remain secretive because both parties are in need 
of the other.  Nacif was a large financier of Mariín’s gubernatorial campaign; in return 
Marín granted Nacif the favor of intervening in the Cacho case.   
Therefore, in Mexico today, traditional control of organized drug trafficking crime 
has broken down.  Elites no longer exploit drug lords through forcing them to pay tribute 
to state agencies in exchange for state protection.  However, other forms of organized 
crime, like Succar’s pedophilia ring, appear to work within Pimentel’s model, or at least 
illustrates the collusive feature of the relationship between organized crime and PRI 
politicians. 
Furthermore, Cacho’s case highlights the lack of accountability for lower level 
officials that operate on authoritarian commands.   The willingness of the police to 
accept and carryout, extralegal methods of coercion and intimidation during Cacho’s 
arrest supports Paul Chevigny’s (2000) argument that torture is a common practice in 
many Latin American societies and in Mexico.  Chevigny argues that “torture is used 
against those who are ‘torturable.”  He classifies the ‘tortuable’ as common criminals 
and rarely middle-class, except in desperate political cases or for corrupt purposes.  
Torture is used just as often as a form of punishment as it is a tool to extract 
information.  Cacho is not lower class, but she is a woman and child activist, a role not 
esteemed in Mexican culture of machismo.  It is for that reason as well as the unlikely 
threat of discipline from police supervisors, that Cacho was subjected to abuse during 
her journey from Cancún to Puebla.  Police generally accept that torture and other 
means of coercion are legitimate tools for use in police activities.     
The mismanagement of the pedophilia case against Succar further illustrates the 
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presence of impunity and uneven application of the rule of law that allows for 
accountability to break down.  Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona writes that at both the 
Mexican federal and state level, “the public prosecutor is the authority responsible for 
initiating the investigation of crimes.  This is largely due to the fact that most Mexican 
police lack practical or legal investigative capacity.  Therefore, the public prosecutor has 
a ‘monopoly’ in the area of criminal action (Zepeda Lecuona: 2007).   The public 
prosecutors’’ offices are overwhelmed with casework. In 2000, local jurisdictions had to 
process an average of 552 cases plus backlog from the previous years (Zepeda 
Lecuona, 2007).  Since this amount of case work does not lend itself to providing quality 
service, agencies often act as “de facto discretionary powers” that are unregulated 
(illegal) and rarely overseen thoroughly by supervisors, opening up opportunities for 
corruption and impunity.   Due to the impossibility of investigating every complaint, 
much of the burden of prosecutions falls to the victim.  For example, victims must bring 
facts and evidence directly to the agency if she desires the case to move forward 
(Zepeda Lecuona, 2007). 
As observed in the case against Succar, the local prosecutor’s office was left to 
its own discretion in prosecuting.  Despite having in their possession Succar’s taped 
conversion, they failed to issue an arrest warrant and to detain the suspect.  
Furthermore, evidence of corruption and mismanagement was abundant during the 
investigatory stage.  The names of the victims were released to the public, despite 
norms of victim protection (Cacho 2005: 56).  Lastly, Miguel Angle Pech Cen leaked to 
Succar the details of Emma’s testimony and the prospects of the AFI detaining him.  
This detail illustrates the intersection of collusion between state agencies and organized 
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crime as well as general mismanagement and impunity within the prosecutor’s office.   
Zepeda Lecuona (2007) urges that state attorney generals’ offices cannot 
tolerate superficial or cosmetic reforms to the criminal justice system any longer, and 
instead require profound transformation.   The public prosecutors’ office was created out 
of the executive branch, during the decades of presidentialism, and like the executive 
branch of those times, the powers had insufficient checks and balances.  The executive 
had converted public prosecutors’ offices into another aspect of an “extensive network 
of control at the disposal of hegemonic political interests” (Zepeda Lecuona: 2007).   
Zepeda Lecuona (2007) suggests a transformation would need to “guarantee 
autonomy of the office responsible for investigating crime and prosecuting presumed 
offenders, to isolate that office from political ambitions and vicissitudes, to endow it with 
autonomy and a career civil-service structure, and to establish a clear-cut system of 
regular supervision by independent organizations.”  Moreover, victims and prisoners 
must be able to rely on safeguards and have access to contribute and/or dispute the 
actions of their investigators.  This requires the public and official prosecution of crimes, 
relieving victims of the high responsibility and costs of sponsoring and investigating the 
facts of the trial, as well as, the legality and good faith of investigators who adhere to 
mandated standards that support basic human rights and dignity of parties involved in 
the investigation (2007).  
 
Significance   
From this case, what can be said about the role of non-governmental 
organizations in promoting social accountability?  Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) 
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present three main areas in which social accountability can be exercised: through the 
judiciary, through mobilization and through the media.  Cacho’s case encompasses all 
three of these aspects.   
 
Influence on the Judiciary 
Lydia Cacho’s case and the social accountability initiated in the judiciary has 
already had a strong positive effect on the Mexican culture of impunity and corruption.  
A federal law de-criminalizing journalistic defamation and libel has been passed, with it 
becoming local law in Mexico City.   
Even though Cacho did not win her Supreme Court case against Marín, the 
existence of the Supreme Court case itself is a landmark.  Her case is the first time that 
the Supreme Court has been willing to investigate a case of an individual regarding 
recent human rights violations, and a landmark for women’s human rights.  The other 
cases in which the Supreme Court has investigated state violence against citizens, 
invoked past uses of violence by the state (the massacres of students in 1968 and the 
assassinations of PAN politicians in the early nineties), both of which were found largely 
inconclusive and without resolution (Tax, January 2, 3007: 1).  Cacho is also the first 
woman to file a federal law suit against a Governor, a prosecutor and a judge. 
 
NGOs as Agenda Setting Agents 
 The social mobilization element of social accountability can also be observed in 
Cacho’s case.   Social mobilization consists of the establishment of permanent civic 
organizations that can then bring about legal claims or reputation costs to the 
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wrongdoers.  Cacho’s case differs slightly from typical models of social mobilization in 
Latin America like Alianza Civica in Mexico, Viva Rio in Brazil and CORREPI 
(Coordinadora contra la Represion Policial e Institucional) which are domestic 
organizations that place topics on the public agenda and become credible and 
authoritative advocates on those issues (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006).   In Cacho’s 
case the permanent agenda setters and authoritative advocates were international 
organizations like Amnesty International, the Committee to Protect Journalists, 
Reporters Sans Fronteras, the Commission for Human Rights and the Society of Inter 
American Press (Cacho, 2005: 12).    
 As demonstrated in Cacho’s case, international human right networks play an 
increasingly strong role as social watchdogs and mobilizers for social accountability.      
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) claim international advocacy groups 
strategically link activities in which members of a diffused principle network develop an 
explicit, visible role in pursuit of a common goal and through organizing information and 
membership to show sophisticated awareness of human rights issue.  When domestic 
outlets of agenda setting and exposure are blocked or limited, international 
organizations can help bring attention and amplification for claims of wrongdoing.  The 
authors propose the boomerang pattern as an alternative pattern established by 
international advocacy groups to combat state violators in the void that presents itself 
because domestic human rights actors were blocked.  In the model, “State A blocks 
redress to organizations within it; they activate network, whose members pressure their 
own states and (if relevant) a third-party organization, which in turn pressures State A 
(Keck and Sikkink: 1998).   
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Figure 3.1 
 
 In Cacho’s case, within hours her colleagues at CIAM-Cancún had contacted 
Amnesty International and others in the network (Cacho, Dec. 29, 2005: 1).  The next 
day Amnesty International sent a letter of concern to Mario Marín Torres as well as the 
governor of Quintana Roo.  Cacho testified that during her detention, one of the officers 
received a call, then subsequently told the other officers that they must take Cacho 
directly to Puebla.  Cacho claims that this was in direct response to concerns expressed 
by Amnesty International (Cacho, 2005: 12). 
 Social mobilization as an element of social accountability can be found in the 
form of domestic civic groups or international human rights networks.  Both work to 
speak as authorities on issues as well as set agendas for legal sanctions.  
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What mechanisms of social accountability were invoked in Cacho’s case?  International 
and domestic human rights and media organizations played at strong role in exposing 
and agenda setting in this case.    
 
The Media’s Role in Increasing Visability 
 The final strategy of social accountability is mediatization (Peruzzotti and 
Smulovitz: 2006).  Social accountability requires visibility and media operations impose 
reputation costs on public agents who work to preserve their images in order to be 
reelected.  Mediatization can be activated by individual journalists, media organizations 
or citizen groups.   
Since media operations were privatized in the 1990s, state control of the media 
has lessened and civic journalism is on the rise (Hughes, 2006).  The media is playing a 
much stronger role as agenda setter and as a watchdog.  To illustrate a general 
example of this trend toward freedom in the media, let’s examine Figure 3.2 illustrates 
when newspapers were considered to have set the agenda across a variety of topics in 
Mexican news.  Newspapers were most assertive when writing about opposition parties 
(52%) while strikingly less with drug traffickers (11%), the church (14%), and the military 
(17%) (Hughes: 2006).   
However, in Cacho’s case, the media was on the forefront of agenda setting and 
reporting.  All of the major newspapers, including international ones like the Washington 
Post and the ABC, covered the case.  This suggests that criticisms of PRI officials can 
possibly be more aggressive in media agenda setting currently or in the future that it 
was in 2000 (figure 3.2).    The advancement of journalistic rights through the 
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decriminalization of libel laws will most likely contribute to the increase role of the media 
in social accountability as a watchdog agent.  
Figure 3.2 
 
Sources: Hughes: 2006. pg. 93 
 
However, Reporters Sans Frontieres, ranks Mexico the second most dangerous 
place to be a journalist in the world, only to Iraq (Press Freedom Round-up: 2006)   
Amnesty International reports that during 2007, ten journalists were murdered and many 
others received threats (Amnesty International: 2007).  Those that investigate organized 
crime networks are especially at risk and investigations by a Special Federal Prosecutor 
of Crimes Against Journalists failed to result in prosecutions of any of those responsible.  
Nacif, Marín, Gamboa Patron, Succar and Angel Yunes all were recipients of 
reputation attacks as a result of media exposure.  Social mobilizations against the Marín 
took place for many weeks in the capital of Puebla after the taped conversations were 
released.  In addition, large crowds do gather at every speaking event Cacho engages 
in, even as recently as February, 2008 (Mexico Reporter, February 8, 2008: 1).    Cacho 
 
Corruption, Pedophilia and Corruption in Mexico                                            Pearsall  51 
also continues to speak as rallies concerning other women’s human rights issues like 
the femicides in Ciudad Juarez.   
 However, the implications of this exposure will not be fully understood until 
government officials try an attempt another electoral run for state office.  Unfortunately, 
in Mexico public memory for wrongdoings committed by political actors is very short.  In 
the short run, politicians affected by reputation costs could lose votes in the next 
election but it would not be uncommon for the very same actor that is scandalized now, 
reappears in a different political position, years later.  This is common practice within the 
PRI.   
 As for the businessmen Nacif, reputation costs are not as clear.  In response to 
labor allegations against his Tarrant Apparel Group, Nacif closed his plants.  Therefore, 
there is precedent for reputations attacks have affected him in the past. 
Succar currently is serving out his sentence for pedophilia in a Cancún jail.  
However, similar to the public memory of crimes committed by state actors, in a few 
years after media attention has left this case, Succar’s sentence maybe reduced and he 
be let out early.  This is not uncommon with organized crime actors or wealthy members 
of Mexican society.   
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the very import role the media and 
domestic organizations played in agenda setting as well as society’s involvement in 
social mobilization.  Without this attention, most likely little would have been done to 
have Succar actually extradited from the U.S. or libel laws be changed in locations 
throughout Mexico.    
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Still present are serious limitations in Cacho’s case as to the protection of the 
human rights of journalists and citizens.  Because the federal congress is still weak, the 
press has to play a strong role as a social watchdog/investigator.  In Cacho’s case, the 
press continually interviewed people involved and reported about significant 
occurrences’ in the case.  Outside of recommending an investigation by the Supreme 
Court into whether or not Governor Marín had violated Cacho’s human rights, the 
Congress was too weak, too entrenched in divisive politics, and not removed enough 
from the PRI domination to hold a hearing.   
 Not only did the press have to play such a central role in pushing results in 
Cacho’s case in order to compensate for the failures of the federal Congress, but 
domestic and international organizations had to play a strong role in setting and pushing 
the agenda.  As a result of pressure from human and civil rights groups like Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, the Committee to Protect Journalists, International 
PEN and others, international attention and pressure was placed on President Calderon 
as well as members of Congress in order to embarrass them into acting in Cacho’s 
favor. 
Moreover, the old centers of power rooted in authoritarian PRI reign, are brought 
to light by Cacho’s case.  Impunity and corruption embedded in state and local politics 
perpetuates an attitude amongst political actors that the state functions for their own, 
and their powerful friends, purposes and personal use.  The reciprocal relationship 
between Governor Marín Torres and Nacif illustrated the collusion between the 
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business community with links to organized crime (Succar) and the PRI.  This illustrates 
the changed relationship the PRI has with organized crime compared to the traditional 
elite-exploitative model emphasized by Pimentel (2000).  Under this understanding it is 
not surprising that local justice was invoked for retaliation.  As Marín, Nacif and Succar’s 
relationships show, those with money and power understand that the resources of the 
state exist for their own personal vendettas and gain.  Local government agencies and 
branches are also entrenched in longstanding loyalties to the old centers of power (PRI) 
and therefore bar progress in editing harsh law regarding freedom of press.  The delay 
in re-writing defamation laws at the local and state exemplifies these roadblocks. 
Lydia Cacho Ribeiro’s case represents the great potential social accountability 
has for controlling governmental actions in representative democracies in general and 
especially in situations like that in Latin America, where citizens’ ability to control 
government action is questionable.  There are many roads that lead to accountability 
and social accountability offers some that are different than traditionally recognized in 
democratic theory.  The specific methods used to impose controls and how they are 
sustained are left open by this research and require more empirical resources and 
debate.  However, this study and the framework given by Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 
reveal that in order for “democracies to achieve politically and legally accountable 
governments, the relationship between institutional mechanisms and specific social 
actions and actors should not be overlooked (2006).   Social accountability offers 
alternative tools for imposing costs on political actors and is a necessary condition for 
the operation of those institution having mandatory sanctioning mechanisms as well as 
remind political actors that they can be held accountable.  
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